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THE CHANGING FOCUS OF PEER REVIEW UNDER
MEDICARE
Peter M. Mellette*
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF PEER REVEW IN HEALTH
CARE FINANCING
Consumers today rely on both physicians and the federal govern-
ment for health care services. A consumer/patient's visit to a phy-
sician is the usual method of access to such services. After examin-
ing the patient, the physician will typically send the patient home
with a prescription for medication or refer the patient for admis-
sion to an appropriate health care provider, such as a hospital. In
either instance, the patient incurs medical bills. If the patient is
age sixty-five or older, the federal government probably pays for
most of those bills through the Medicare program.'
As a method of controlling Medicare costs and reducing unnec-
essary medical care, Congress created several peer review systems
to review physician and hospital treatment practices. This article
will review the growing federal involvement in professional peer re-
view and will analyze the goals and results of peer review legisla-
tion. The article will also examine how physician and provider
groups have responded to federal peer review efforts. Finally, the
article will suggest how the Medicare prospective payment system
and current peer review efforts will increase the conflicts between
cost and quality of care concerns for physicians and other health
care providers.
A. Effects of Treatment Patterns and Public Financing
1. How Physicians Ration Health Care Resources
The above scenario repeats itself daily. The typical consumer's
involvement in health care decisions is minimal, especially after
the initial decision to seek care.2 The consumer-patient usually
* Associate, Crews, Hancock & Dunn, Richmond, Virginia. A.B., 1980, Dartmouth Col-
lege; J.D., 1985, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395a-1395xx (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
2. The decision to seek medical care depends on a number of interrelated factors: (1) the
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lacks sufficient information to weigh the costs and the benefits,
both to himself and to others, of additional increments of medical
services. Accordingly, the patient typically delegates both diagnos-
tic and treatment authority to the professionally trained physician
and his staff.3
Although the modern physician maintains a dominant role in
treatment decisions, the physician relies heavily on the participa-
tion of hospitals and third-party payors during patient treatment.4
The hospital provides the physician with an array of diagnostic
and treatment devices for patient care, and the payor, usually the
federal government or a commercial insurer, guarantees payment
to the physician and hospital for such care. In this way, both the
hospital and the payor help consumers gain access to needed
health care services. However, neither the hospital nor the payor is
in a position to participate in treatment decisions on an equal basis
with the physician.
A hospital can exercise only limited control over treatment deci-
sions because its financial survival depends upon its continued ac-
cess to the physician's skill and his patient clientele. By law and
custom, a hospital's non-physician staff cannot make major treat-
ment decisions without the physician's assistance and oversight.'
Without the physician's patient referral many hospital beds would
remain empty, adversely affecting the hospital's cash flow. In light
of these concerns, hospitals have allowed physicians to exercise
broad discretion in patient treatment.
individual's underlying state of health; (2) his or her perception of need; and (3) the availa-
bility (access and cost) of such care. Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Eco-
nomic Appraisal, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 252, 258 (1970). The development of third-
party insurance (including government expenditures through Medicare and Medicaid) and
the broadening of employee health benefits have virtually eliminated cost as a major factor
in individual decisionmaking. See infra note 13.
3. The health care consumer has the dual characteristics of being ignorant about
medicine and of loathing to take risks concerning his or her health. See Lave & Lave, supra
note 2, at 259; see also Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy For the Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1533-41 (1970) (emphasizing the physician's
control over treatment decisions and the patient's passivity under the circumstances).
4. See infra notes 6, 13 & 39.
5. Most states limit the role of non-physicians in treatment decisions. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54-274 to -281.4 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (licensing and delegation); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1395x(e) (1982) (Medicare requirement).
6. The advantages of physician proximity to the expensive medical equipment that a hos-
pital can offer prompted independent practitioners in the early twentieth century to join
hospital medical staffs. The hospital, dependent upon the skill and patient clientele of phy-
sicians, allowed physicians to extend their professional dominance into the hospital setting.
[Vol. 20:315
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A third-party payor has some financial control over general phy-
sician practices, but is not present when physicians weigh the costs
and benefits of particular treatment decisions. A payor typically
reviews a physician's treatment decision weeks after the patient
has received care. At that point, the payor is under pressure to
approve payment of the attendant medical bills. If the patient
completely recovers from his or her illness, a payor then has diffi-
culty denying the payment request, even if the physician's treat-
ment decisions were suspect.'
Physicians tend to ignore treatment advice from hospitals and
payors. Where a payor denies payment for care, the affected physi-
cian may not even notice the denial; instead, the physician's billing
office may merely seek reimbursement from the patient., If the
physician does note the payment denial, he may nonetheless elect
to follow the same treatment pattern with subsequent patients be-
cause of his understanding of the medical literature and his knowl-
edge of how fellow practitioners treat similar patients.9 Rising con-
See Scott, Managing Professional Work: Three Models of Control for Health Organiza-
tions, in ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE IN HEALTH CARE QUALITY ASSURANCE 41, 44-45 (R. Luke,
J. Krueger & R. Modrow eds. 1983).
7. See infra note 9.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1982); see also id. § 1395n(c) (provider right to seek reim-
bursement from patient for inpatient care).
9. The community's standard of care can be thought of as the average choice of therapy
for a group that encompasses the individual treatment decisions of similarly situated physi-
cians, namely physicians who have similar specialty training, if any, and who care for the
same type of patient complaint. The standard thereby varies, depending on the patient di-
agnosis and the physician's measurable specialty training. The standard also will vary from
community to community, as shown by epidemiological studies. See, e.g., Wennberg & Git-
telsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102 (1973).
In reviewing the diagnosis-specific treatment variations in New England communities,
Professor Wennberg found that
[tihe [treatment] procedures exhibiting the most variation are often for conditions
that are part of the aging process. The controversies [concerning the value of specific
treatments] arise because for such conditions the natural history of the untreated or.
conservatively treated case is often poorly understood . . . . As a consequence, the
opinions of individual doctors can vary substantially, based upon subjective experi-
ence ....
• . . By contrast, the low-variation procedures derive from quite specific conditions
for which there is a professional concensus on the preferred place or style of treat-
ment . . . . For these conditions, practice style, at least in the United States, only
plays a small part in affecting demand.
Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFF.
6, 9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as A Proposal for Action]. Wennberg's findings suggest that
treatment norms for Medicare patients may be difficult to determine. Many Medicare pa-
tients have diagnoses that show high variations because their complaints are related to the
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sumer expectations and the threat of malpractice claims also affect
the physician's choice of treatment. 10 The use of additional and
more sophisticated treatment techniques provides physicians with
protection against lawsuits, even if the treatment approach runs
counter to payor preferences. This lack of effective feedback to
physicians regarding appropriate treatment decisions and the
threat of malpractice claims lead many physicians to make the
same decisions, even if experience shows these decisions to be
inappropriate.1
Patients generally benefit from physician treatment decisions,
even if the particular decision was inappropriate and costly. More-
over, a patient without medical knowledge is in no position to
question such decisions, particularly in a life-saving context. With
the unbridled discretion and authority to choose the type of treat-
ment in most instances, a physician may select a course of treat-
ment with only marginal diagnostic or therapeutic benefit but
which costs the patient and the payor considerably more money. 2
The prospect of such choices has made increasing health care costs
for individuals and for society all the more likely."3
aging process.
As Wennberg suggests, there is no effective professional consensus on the value of particu-
lar therapies for many diagnoses. Very often, physicians disagree about the diagnosis. These
complications limit a payor's opportunity for promoting consistent treatment decisions by
physicians. In the past, these limitations have hindered payor efforts to control the utiliza-
tion of health care resources and the overall cost of health care. Wennberg, McPherson &
Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospital Costs?, 311
NEw ENG. J. MED. 295, 298-99 (1984). However, continued efforts by payors and others to
inform physicians that existing variations in treatment practices have no effect on patient
recovery may improve the consistency of physician treatment for many diagnoses. See A
Proposal for Action, supra this note, at 21-25.
10. Much has been written on the subject of "defensive medicine," but the topic is be-
yond the scope of this article. See generally Grad, Medical Malpractice and Its Implica-
tions for Public Health, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 397 (R.
Roemer & G. McKray eds. 1980); Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Mal-
practice, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare (1973).
11. See supra note 9.
12. Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The
Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 12 (1975).
13. Havighurst and Blumstein state:
[T]he need for particular health services is frequently not an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion but is, instead, heavily dependent upon the financial resources available.
... Ever since World War II, labor bargaining and the favorable tax treatment of
group health insurance premiums have helped to induce a steady increase in insur-
ance coverage. While the Medicare and Medicaid programs enacted in 1965 [pro-
vided] the most dramatic infusion of new demand and have been widely blamed for
the cost escalation, they were only part of a larger trend toward third-party payment
which was also attended by a steady cost rise. As insurance and government financing
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2. The Effect of Public Funding on the Payor Rationing Process
In 1965, Congress created the Medicare program,14 seeking to
improve the elderly population's access to quality health care ser-
vices. 15 Pursuant to congressional mandate, the federal government
became a third-party payor. Under Medicare Part A, the federal
Medicare program reimbursed institutional providers such as hos-
pitals for the reasonable costs of providing care to Medicare bene-
ficiaries.' 6 Congress limited Medicare's beneficiary population al-
most exclusively to persons over the age of sixty-five. In addition,
Congress gave the elderly the option to participate in a comple-
mentary health insurance program, known as Medicare Part B, for
payment of physician services to beneficiaries. 17
The enactment of Medicare contributed to a general expansion
of third-party insurance coverage for all age groups.' 8 The federal
government's growing role as a payor of health care services under
both Medicare and Medicaid 19 reduced consumer concerns over ac-
cess to, equity of, and cost of care. Meanwhile, physicians and hos-
pitals enjoyed the prosperity created by federal involvement. Phy-
sicians used their treatment authority to obtain the benefits of new
reduced or eliminated the patient's concern about the cost of care, the physician
came to see himself less as a fiduciary with a responsibility for the patient's pocket-
book as well as his health and more as a technician freed by insurance to pursue
medical results withput regard to cost.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395a- 1395xx (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
15. See Zubkoff & Blumstein, The Medical Marketplace: Health Policy Formulation in
Consideration of Economic Structure, in 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE COST OF MEDICAL
CARE 1976-1977, at 73, 91 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Medical Marketplace].
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (1982 & Supp. I 1983) (statutory definition of reasonable
cost). The working definition of what is "reasonable" has changed considerably over the
years as both Congress and the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) have sought
to contain rising program costs. See Lave, Hospital Reimbursement Under Medicare, 62
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 251, 252-53 (1984).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (1982). The method of physician payment, like that for hospi-
tals, has received considerable attention in recent years. For more information, see Medi-
care: Physician Payment Options, Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
18. See supra note 13.
19. Title XIX of the Social Security Act covers the Medicaid program. Congress enacted
Medicaid in order to improve the access of low income Americans to health care services.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982). Medicaid payments to nursing homes and hospitals are
now based on the costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982). Congress included both this provision and a provision which made
permissive state Medicaid agency contracts with local PSROs for peer review in the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pun. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 794 (codified in
pertinent part in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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technologies and therapies covered by third-party payment.2" Hos-
pitals, once a business left to charitable institutions, began to real-
ize profits, making hospital development and expansion more feasi-
ble.21 Consumers were happy because they received better
treatment at lower out-of-pocket costs. However, payors such as
the federal government were alarmed by the substantial increases
in ordered services and hospital capital costs.22 The resulting in-
crease in Medicare program costs prompted Congress to seek
greater control over cost-inflation and over-utilization of Medicare-
covered services.
20. Many studies have shown that the mere availability of medical equipment creates a
demand for its use. See, e.g., Klarman, Approaches to Moderating the Increases in Medical
Care Costs, 7 MED. CARE 175 (1969). Federal efforts at developing standards for the planned
introduction and use of new technologies include the Health Services Research, Health Sta-
tistics, and Health Care Technology Act of 1978, PUB. L. No. 95-623, 92 Stat. 3443 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Section 309 of the Act authorized federal funding for
technology assessment and established a mechanism for development and promulgation of
standards, norms and criteria for the use of new technology.
21. Due to public concern over the effect of hospital development on health care costs,
capital expenditures by health care facilities are currently regulated by federal and state
administrative agencies. See The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, Pua. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300m-
1 to 300n (1982)).
The 1974 Act encouraged states to develop mandatory bed and health service laws and
standards. These state laws limited hospital growth by requiring all health care facilities to
receive state certification that a need existed in the facility's service area before a facility
could add new beds or equipment. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1 to -102.11 (Repl.
Vol. 1985).
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (the Medicare provisions) also includes a review of
capital expenditures under § 1122. However, § 1122 applies only to reimbursement for those
capital expenditures allocable to Medicare patients. The § 1122 program does not control
the acquisition of equipment or services with an initial cost that was insignificant or recov-
erable from other third-party payors.
Although beyond the scope of this article, many evaluations of health planning activities
at the state and federal level are available. For more information, see Klarman, Health
Planning: Progress, Prospects, And Issues, 56 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 78 (1978) (eco-
nomic appraisal); Payton & Powmer, Regulation Through The Looking Glass: Hospitals,
Blue Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980) (historical perspective);
Sloan & Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input Use, 23 J. L. & EcoN.
81 (1980) (same). The history of health planning law reveals the piecemeal approach taken
to date in meeting quality-assurance and cost-containment goals. See generally Fielding,
PSROs and HSAs-Shall the Twain Meet?, in P.S.R.O.: THE PROMISE, PERSPECTIVE, AND
POTENTIAL 317 (J. Bussman & S. Davidson eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as P.S.R.O.
PROMISE].
22. The statistics are particularly revealing: between fiscal years 1965 and 1975, public
expenditures for health care costs rose from 21% to 42% of total personal health expendi-
tures. Over the same period, the proportion of the gross national product (GNP) spent in
the health sector rose from 5.9% to 8.4%. Gibson & Mueller, National Health Expendi-
tures, Fiscal Year 1976, 40 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 4, 18 (1977). Current estimates show that
health sector expenditures have increased to over 10% of the GNP for fiscal year 1984.
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B. Congressional Responses to Medicare Cost Increases
1. Changes in Hospital Payment
From 1965 to 1982, the Medicare program reimbursed partici-
pating hospitals23 for care to beneficiaries on a "reasonable cost"
basis.24 The Medicare provisions in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) 25 shifted the focus of hospital
reimbursement from a cost per diem system to a diagnosis-related
group (DRG) system. 2 The Medicare program now pays a prede-
termined price per patient admission, according to the patient's di-
agnosis at discharge. Each DRG rate includes all of the typical
ancillary costs for patients with that particular diagnosis as well as
the patient's room and board costs for typical hospital stays.
Congress adopted the DRG system following a year of adminis-
trative development. TEFRA directed the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to develop the prospective payment sys-
tem based on typical provider payments for each diagnosis.28 Con-
23. A participating hospital negotiates an agreement with the Medicare program to pro-
vide care to eligible beneficiaries and is thereby subject to the conditions of participation in
the program, one of which is peer review. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035 (1984).
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. PUB. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 331 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
26. Prior to the implementation of the DRG system, hospitals received payment from
Medicare for each day the patient remained in the hospital and for each service the patient
received, as long as the hospital stay and service were "medically necessary" and the costs
were reasonable. Hospitals had no incentive to keep these costs to a minimum because more
services ordered by physicians and delivered by hospitals led to more reimbursement re-
ceived by both hospitals and physicians. Under the DRG system, a hospital receives a fixed
sum for each patient admission, based on the patient's diagnosis. See, e.g., New Jersey's
Hospital Reimbursement System: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1983) (statement of Dennis J. Duffy, Executive Vice-President, Subur-
ban Medical Review Organization) [hereinafter cited as The New Jersey DRG Experience];
see also Lave, supra note 16, at 253. New Jersey received a HCFA demonstration project
waiver in 1980, and established the first large-scale DRG experiment in the country. The
demonstration project was reportedly successful in reducing patient lengths of stay and hos-
pital operating expenses, although the number of patient admissions rose slightly at DRG-
funded hospitals. The New Jersey all-payor DRG system differs in two major respects from
the nationwide program that Congress approved: (1) the nationwide system covers payment
for Medicare beneficiaries only; and (2) the New Jersey DRG rates are hospital-specific,
while the Medicare rates are gradually becoming fixed for each case regardless of hospital
location. See The New Jersey DRG Experience, supra this note, at 3-6 (statement of J.
Richard Goldstein, M.D., Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Health). Dr. Goldstein
identified five other differences between the state and national DRG programs which go
beyond the scope of this article.
27. See Wennberg, McPherson & Caper, supra note 9, at 295.
28. PUB. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 101(b)(3), 96 Stat. 324, 335 (1982) (codified as amended at
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gress sought a payment system that would eliminate the incentive
among hospitals and physicians to keep patients in the hospital
longer or provide them with more ancillary services in order to ob-
tain more money.2"
In the Social Security Amendments of 1983,30 Congress relied on
HHS Secretary's recommendation that Congress base the Medi-
care prospective payment system for participating hospitals on the
New Jersey DRG demonstration project. 31 The congressional ini-
tiatives of 1982 and 1983 now limit the Medicare program funds
available for each hospital admission. With a fixed payment level
per diagnosis, hospitals can suffer an immediate cash shortfall if a
patient's length of stay or ancillary studies exceed those of a typi-
cal patient with the same diagnosis. Health care policy experts an-
ticipate that these financing provisions will give hospitals an incen-
tive to promote early patient discharge and lower utilization of
hospital services.32 In theory, the new financing mechanism will in-
directly force admitting physicians to discharge patients earlier
42 U.S.C. § 1326b-5 (1982)); see also J. O'SULLIVAN & G. MARKUS, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
PROVISIONS OF THE "TAx EQUITY AND FiscAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982" (P.L. 97-248)
(1982).
29. See Lave, supra note 16, at 252, 260-61.
30. PuB. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 141, 149 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
31. For a discussion of the New Jersey program, see The New Jersey DRG Experience,
supra note 26.
The basic features of the prospective payment system that Congress approved are:
1. all Medicare patients are classified as falling into one of 468 DRGs;
2. with the exception of a limited number of "outlier" patients which have medi-
cally necessary but atypically long lengths of patient stay ("day" outliers) or atypi-
cally expensive treatments ("cost" outliers), each hospital will receive a fixed pay-
ment per DRG to cover operating costs;
3. each hospital's DRG payment will include allowances for variations in area
wages, urban versus rural population mix, and the number of full-time interns and
residents on the hospital staff;
4. capital costs and direct educational costs are to be paid separately ("passed
through") until such time as the HHS Secretary can propose a method acceptable to
Congress for including these costs in the prospective DRG rates; and
5. nationwide DRG rates (plus allowances) will gradually replace each hospital's
reasonable cost-based rates for each DRG over a three-year phase-in period.
See Lave, supra note 16, at 253. The DRG system reduces the conflict between peer review
organization efforts to control use of costly services where less expensive alternatives are
available and the contrary incentives of cost-based reimbursment to use the most sophisti-
cated services available. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
32. See Wennberg, McPherson & Caper, supra note 9, at 297-99. In addition, note that
DRG payments may also cause higher health care costs in the absence of effective utilization
controls due to increased hospital admissions. Id.
PEER REVIEW UNDER MEDICARE
and to perform fewer ancillary studies during each hospital stay."3
2. Development of Peer Review Systems
In creating the Medicare program, Congress looked for some
method of direct control over the quality, cost, and utilization of
health care services by Medicare beneficiaries. Because of physi-
cian control over the treatment method and locatiori of care, the
physician's treatment decisions became the ultimate target for cost
control efforts. Congress' first cost control measure was the Utiliza-
tion Review (UR) program, a part of the original Medicare legisla-
tion.3 4 The Medicare UR provisions still exist; however, the provi-
sions have not been applied since 1972 to those hospitals in areas
where an active Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO)35 or Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organi-
zation (PRO) program 36 exists.37 The development of each of these
three programs is discussed in the remainder of this article. In
each case, the program's ability to balance cost and quality con-
cerns38 in the context of Medicare payment methods has been de-
terminative of continued congressional support.
33. See, e.g., Zaslow, Life After Legislation: Effects of TEFRA and DRG on Physician-
Hospital Relationships, 12 LEGAL Asp. OF MED. PRAC. 1, 1-2 (Jan. 1984).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1982) (utilization review provisions in current Medicare
Act).
35. See PUB. L. No. 92-603, tit. II, § 249(F), 86 Stat. 1429 (1972) (superseded by PUB. L.
No. 97-248, tit. I, § 143, 96 Stat. 382 (1982)) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to c-12
(1982)).
36. See PuB. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 143, 96 Stat. 382 (1982) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-12 (1982)).
37. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035(m) (1984) (PRO and PSRO review in lieu of UR
requirement).
38. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 12, at 15-21, 62-68. The authors present
an illustration of how one might determine an optimal level of health care spending based
upon the relationship between health care "benefits" and "costs." Beyond the optimal point
there exists a "quality/cost no man's land" that reflects distortions created by physician
control over demand and the inability of third-party payors or providers to impose limits on
the provision of care falling in this range. Another figure illustrates how the infusion of
government spending and private insurance coverage can prevent optimal health care
spending decisions by reducing consumer cost barriers. Although total cost remains the
same, the individual may be encouraged to seek out additional care. Id. at 17-18.
1986]
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF PEER REVIEW
A. Beginnings: Hospital-Based Utilization Review Committees
and the Kaiser Plan
Peer review was not a new idea when Congress first adopted it in
1965. Before Congress enacted the Medicare program, physician
peer review committees on hospital medical staffs reviewed indi-
vidual treatment decisions. These hospital medical staff commit-
tees, also known as utilization review committees, gave physicians
an opportunity to observe and correct one another.39 The quality
of patient care,40 rather than its cost, was the major consideration
of the pre-Medicare utilization review committees.41 These early
review committees looked at a patient's response to treatment and
decided, based on their knowledge of common treatment practices,
if the physician had acted properly and competently.42
The hospital staff committees found that treatment outcomes
were easy to measure-either the patient's condition improved or
it worsened. However, these outcome studies could not direct phy-
39. See, e.g., G. SILVER, A SPy IN THE HOUSE OF MEDICINE 177-80 (1976) (emphasizing the
medieval guild beginnings of medicine and the traditional delegation of professional stan-
dards and quality control to the profession). The "guild spirit" remains strong among many
physicians who vehemently oppose all government intervention in the health sector. A re-
cent example of this view was expressed by Rep. Ron Paul, M.D. who stated, "Federal inter-
vention can in no way improve medical care, but it can impose higher costs and make it
much harder for physicians to do their real job-that is, to care for patients .... But even
more disturbing than the cost in dollars of an increased PSRO presence is the cost in terms
of human freedom. PSROs, in frank terms, represent our nation's distressing creep toward
state control of medicine." PSRO Proposals: Hearing on S. 1250 and S. 2142 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 56-60
(1982) [hereinafter cited as PSRO Proposals].
The development of peer review in the hospital setting has occurred in the last century.
Prior to the 20th century, hospitals were viewed as a place of last resort-a place to die. It is
only with the advent of drug therapies, such as antibiotics, and modern diagnostic technol-
ogy that hospitals have become a center for curative treatment:
In my father's time, talking with the patient was the biggest part of medicine, for it
was almost all there was to do. . . . Many patients [today] go home speedily, in good
health, cured of their diseases. In my father's day this happened much less often, and
when it did, it was a matter of good luck or a strong constitution. When it happens
today, it is more frequently due to technology.
L. THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE WATCHER 59 (1983).
40. Quality of care is the traditional goal of peer review. A useful measure of quality, like
that of "health," is difficult to define. See, e.g., Lave & Lave, supra note 2, at 256 (describ-
ing quality of care as an "amorphous concept" composed of two dimensions: (1) the subjec-
tive perception of the patient; and (2) objective medical efficacy).
41. Scott, supra note 6, at 45.
42. G. SILVER, supra note 39, at 179-80.
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sicians to utilize more appropriate treatment methods. A poor out-
come, such as a patient death, was in many ways inconclusive be-
cause of the myriad potential causes. It did not necessarily mean
that the physician's treatment decisions were in error. 3
The potential for inconsistent results with patient outcome anal-
yses led utilization review committees to develop other measures to
gauge the quality of a physician's treatment decisions.44 Over time,
the committees began to use more sensitive criteria in reviewing
physician behavior. These "process assessments" looked at
whether a physician's treatment decisions were necessarily for the
good of the patient and whether a physician followed community
standards of care in treating his patients.45
Hospital-based utilization committee reviews using process as-
sessments encouraged competent physician behavior, and a com-
mittee's policy of confidentiality prompted physician participation
and eased physician resistance. If some corrective action, such as
revocation of hospital staff privileges, proved necessary for re-
peated use of improper treatment methods, then the review com-
mittee would inform the hospital administration and the executive
committee of the medical staff.46
In the 1940's and 1950's, Kaiser-Permanente47 began to use peer
review to control costs and improve the quality of care for its bene-
ficiaries. Kaiser's Foundation for Medical Care of San Joaquin
County offered, at minimal extra cost, a prepaid insurance plan for
physician office visits. As part of their contracts with Kaiser, par-
ticipating physicians had to accept inpatient review by a hospital
43. Id. at 175.
44. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 12, at 28. The authors go on to state that out-
come assessment may be more appropriate where process standards, mandated on a large
scale, could increase the cost of care dramatically without significant improvements in a
patient's health. Ideally, professional process standards may narrow the margin for error;
however, they have great costs as perfection is approached. Further, such standards may not
exist, as there often is no professional consensus on which therapeutic measures lead to good
outcomes. Id. at 29.
45. G. SILVER, supra note 39, at 175; see also supra note 9 (discussing community stan-
dards of care).
46. G. SILVER, supra note 39, at 180. The intricacies of medical staff organizations and the
due process questions surrounding the grant and revocation of medical staff privileges are
beyond the scope of this article. For further information, see Ludlam, Physician-Hospital
Relations: The Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 879 (1970).
47. Kaiser-Permanente owns a number of hospitals, primarily in the Western United
States. Kaiser is well known for its pioneering efforts in health care financing. See generally
Harrington, Foundations for Medical Care: A Stepping Stone to PSRO, in PSRO PROMISE,
supra note 21, at 17 (history of the Kaiser peer review program).
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utilization review committee. Kaiser designed its plan to minimize
hospital bed use and maximize patient reliance on office-based
medical care.4 s By the 1960's, most hospitals had also developed
utilization review committees for quality of care reviews. Such hos-
pital committees were a condition of continued accreditation.49
B. The Utilization Review Program
In 1965, Congress adopted its first peer review program in Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act.5 0 UR program requirements in-
cluded measurement of the lengths of stay and the use of ancillary
services by patients in the hospital.5 1 If Medicare-funded patients
stayed longer or used more hospital services than the norm, the
UR program required physicians to justify the additional patient-
days or services to a hospital utilization review committee. 52 If the
committee decided the excess was not justified, then it was sup-
posed to report its findings to the Medicare fiscal intermediary
("intermediary").53 The intermediary could then deny hospital
payment for the excess days of care.
The UR program had shortcomings from a cost control stand-
point. First, Congress gave physicians on participating hospital
utilization review committees considerable discretion in carrying
out UR reviews. Physician committees were allowed to develop
their own review procedures and standards. 4 Trained to respect
and rely upon professional control of treatment decisions, these
physician committees were reluctant to inform the intermediary of
48. See S. PALMER & D. GILL, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND PEER REVIEW IN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 10-11, HEW PUB. No. 77-1429
(1977).
49. See Scott, supra note 6, at 46-47.
50. PUB. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to
1395xx (1982 & Supp. I 1983)).
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035j (1984) (describing medical care evaluation studies).
52. See id. § 405.1035g (extended stay review).
53. The fiscal intermediary (FI) is a regional or statewide organization, such as Blue
Cross, which contracts with the Medicare program to review beneficiary claims and disburse
funds for approved claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h(a), 1395u(a)(1) (1982).
54. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.1035(b)(1) (1969) (conformance with statute met by submission of
a hospital review plan and by certification that plan was in effect). The Senate Finance
Committee found, inter alia, the following reasons for ineffective utilization review: defi-
cient regulations, laxity both by intermediaries and by the Social Security Administration,
conflicts of interest in institutions, insufficient professional participation, and the absence of
norms. See Havighuret & Blumstein, supra note 12, at 38-39 & n.112 (citing STAFF OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: PROBLEMS, IS-
SUES, AND ALTERNATIVES 3-27 (Comm. Print 1970)).
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any overuse of hospital services by their colleagues. A second prob-
lem was that physicians holding a financial interest in the hospital
often participated on hospital utilization review committees. Put-
ting such physicians in a position to approve or deny payment for
hospital care created a conflict of interest.5 5 Finally, hospital utili-
zation review committees were often reluctant to tell a physician
how to practice medicine, at least where the physician was not
grossly incompetent.5 6 By the 1970's, Congress became alarmed by
the cost overruns in the Medicare program and set out to develop a
new approach.
C. The Professional Standards Review Organization Program
1. Legislative History
In 1971, Senator Bennett proposed legislation, which Congress
adopted during the 1972 session, to create a nationwide network of
PSROs.5 7 Congress' intent in enacting the PSRO program was to
control costs and improve the quality of patient care through re-
ductions in unnecessary utilization. The declared congressional
purpose was
to assure, through the application of suitable procedures of profes-
sional standards review, that the services for which payment may be
made under this chapter will conform to appropriate professional
standards for the provision of health care and that payment for such
services will be made-
(1) only when, and to the extent, medically necessary, as deter-
mined in the exercise of reasonable limits of professional discretion;
and
(2) in the case of services provided by a hospital or other health
55. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.1035(d)(2)(iii) (1969) (compliance with statute met by a review
committee that was broadly representative of the medical staff and that had at least one
member without financial interest in the hospital). In addition to conflict situations, there
was also a series of articles in the Chicago Sun-Times that revealed many improprieties in
the use of Medicare funds by physicians on the staff of the Cook County Hospital. These
reported abuses led to a Finance Committee hearing that resulted in the 1972 amendments.
See Bennett, The History of the Bennett Amendment, in PSRO PROMi E, supra note 21, at
4-5.
56. Scott refers to this trait as the "ethic of professional courtesy." Scott, supra note 6, at
48-49.
57. Bennett, supra note 55, at 6. The PSRO Act, PuB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F, 86 Stat. 1429
(1972) (superseded by PUB. L. No. 97-248, tit I, § 143, 96 Stat. 382 (1982)) makes up Part B
of Title XI of the Social Security Act. The statute was replaced by the PRO program in
1982. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-12 (1982).
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care facility on an inpatient basis, only when and for such period as
such services cannot, consistent with professionally recognized
health care standards, effectively be provided on an outpatient basis
or more economically in an inpatient health care facility of a differ-
ent type, as determined in the exercise of reasonable limits of pro-
fessional discretion."'
The emphasis on cost control is readily apparent from the state-
ment of purpose; however, the prefatory language maintained
much of the UR program's emphasis on physician discretion in es-
tablishing and enforcing standards of practice.59 The PSRO pro-
gram differed from the UR program because the PSROs, desig-
nated by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW),
now had the power to perform their own reviews if the hospital
review committees failed to do S0.60
2. PSRO Operation
The PSRO Act instructed the Secretary of HEW to designate
PSRO areas on a nationwide basis by January 1, 1974.1 These ar-
eas ranged in size from part of a city to entire states, depending on
the number of physicians residing in the area.2 PSRO proponents
in Congress anticipated that local medical societies would apply for
and receive PSRO designation. 3 The PSRO Act required the Sec-
58. The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1429-30 (1972) (emphasis
added).
59. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
60. See The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1435 (1972).
61. Id., 86 Stat. at 1430. Two hundred and three PSRO areas were designated in March
1974 although not every area became fully operational, if at all, until much later. See A.
GOSFIELD, PSROs: THE LAW AND THE HEALTH CONSUMER 8 & n.35 (1975). The number of
PSROs peaked at 187 in 1981. PSRO Proposals, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Sen.
Baucus).
One of the differences between the PSRO and PRO programs is in the designation of
review areas. The Secretary of HHS now must use states as geographic areas unless the
Secretary determines that a local or regional area meets certain criteria based on hospital
admissions and availability of services. See The Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, PuB.
L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 143, 96 Stat. 381, 382 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-2 (a) (1982)). The redefinition of a peer review area reflects the growing trend towards
national peer review standards.
62. See 42 C.F.R. § 460.2 (1984).
63. The PSRO Act reflected this view by directing HEW to approve all physician-run
"qualified organizations" as the local PSRO before contracting with payor organizations.
See The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1431 (1972). The PSRO
Act, unlike the PRO Act, also gave local physicians the power to object to and to veto HEW
agreements with payor organizations. See id., 86 Stat. at 1431-32.
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retary to enter into a PSRO agreement with a qualified organiza-
tion that included a substantial proportion of the area's licensed
physicians4.6  However, the statute allowed the Secretary to appoint
non-physician review organizations, such as Medicare in-
termediaries, as PSROs in areas where local physicians opposed
participation in the PSRO program. 5
The Secretary's appointment of a non-physician review organiza-
tion, such as an intermediary, as the local PSRO did not change
the scope of PSRO review because of two statutory requirements.
First, only physiciaxis, albeit disinterested ones, could evaluate
their peers.6 This guaranteed that PSRO reviews would rely on
physician expertise in review decisions and prevented non-physi-
cian, intermediary-run PSROs from focusing on Medicare program
costs and ignoring the medical benefits of particular treatment de-
cisions. Second, the statute required the PSRO to accept the find-
ings of hospital utilization review committees in all cases once the
PSRO had determined that a hospital's in-house review was effec-
tive.6 7 This became important when the PSRO delegated review
responsibilities to hospital committees. A physician or non-physi-
cian PSRO was often willing to share review responsibilities when
it led to improved relations with provider groups. Further, a re-
fusal to delegate meant only that the PSRO had to perform the
review function itself.6 '
64. A proposed PSRO had to have the support of at least 25% of the physicians in the
PSRO area before the Secretary could approve it.
65. The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. at 1430-31 (1972). Again, the
PRO Act increases the power of the Secretary to negotiate agreements with profit-making,
non-physician groups, including third-party payors with sufficient numbers of physicians
available to perform review. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1982). One commentator has suggested
that the association of peer review and payment authority within the same organization
poses antitrust problems. See Hastings, Legal Issues Raised by Private Review Activities of
Medical Peer-Review Organizations, 8 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 293, 308-10 (1983).
66. See The PSRO Act, PuB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1433-34 (1972). The
provisions prohibiting on-site review by physicians with a financial interest in an institution
and limiting hospital peer responsibilities of physicians with active staff privileges corrected
a conflict of interest problem present in the Utilization Review program. See supra notes
54-55 and accompanying text.
67. The PSRO Act, PuB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1435 (1972).
68. A. GOSFIELD, supra note 61, at 73. The PSRO, once operational, was required to per-
form three types of patient admission review in short-stay general hospitals. The review had
to include: (1) a certification of the necessity and appropriateness of patient admissions to
the hospital (admission certification); (2) an assessment of the patient's need for continued
hospitalization (continued stay review); and (3) retrospective studies of specific problems or
diagnoses at a health care facility (medical care evaluation studies). PSROs were also re-
quired to develop, over time, an analysis of the utilization patterns of patients, practitioners
and providers on an individual and/or aggregate basis (profile reviews). See Price, Health
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Congress gave the PSROs general objectives and guidelines for
conducting peer reviews. The PSRO law made PSROs responsible
for determining whether the health care services and items paid
for by Medicare and Medicaid were "medically necessary," "of
professionally recognized standards of health care" quality, and
provided in the most effective and economical setting. 9 The ad-
mitting physician and the hospital had parallel statutory duties of
assuring medical necessity and quality of care before treating
Medicare beneficiaries. 70 The physician and the hospital also had
to provide evidence, at the PSRO's request, that the particular
health care services and items satisfied the medical necessity and
quality of care tests.71 Finally, the PSRO Act instructed each phy-
sician and hospital to authorize inpatient care only when medi-
cally necessary and when a patient could not receive care in a more
economical setting.72
A PSRO's means of measuring "medical necessity" became the
critical variable in its peer review activities. Congress included a
section in the PSRO Act on "norms of health care services, ' 73 de-
scribed as "the principal point of [PSRO] evaluation and re-
view."'74 The PSRO law referred to lengths of patient stays in hos-
pitals and thereby defined a norm as a typical pattern of patient
care for each diagnosis and by each age group within a region.75The Secretary of HEW, through enabling regulations collected in
Systems Agencies and Peer Review Organizations: Experiments in Regulating the Delivery
of Health Care, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 359, 384 (R. Roe-
mar & G. McKray eds. 1980); P.S.R.O. PROGRAM MANUAL, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STAN-
DARDS REVIEW, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PSRO
PROGRAM MANUAL]. The physician profiles were designed, in piart, to address the growing
concerns over area-wide variations in health care delivery and supplier-induced demand.
See supra note 9. For more information on the development of these review mechanisms in
practice, see generally PSRO PROMISE, supra note 21.
69. See The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1433 (1972). Note
that this language parallels the congressional declaration of purpose. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text. The PSRO program initially had review authority over both Medicare
and Medicaid payment. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, PUB. L. No. 97-25,
95 Stat. 357 (1981), limited mandatory PSRO review to the Medicare program.
70. The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1438-39 (1972). The
PSRO Act specifically exempted physicians who exercised due care in treating patients by
using PSRO norms and criteria from malpractice liability. See id., 86 Stat. at 1444.
71. Id., 86 Stat. at 1438.
72. Id., 86 Stat. at 1438-39.
73. See id., 86 Stat. at 1435-36.
74. Id., 86 Stat. at 1436.
75. Id., 86 Stat. at 1435-36.
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the PSRO Program Manual, 76 instructed each PSRO to develop its
own regional norms by measuring quantifiable items such as aver-
age length of patient stay for a particular diagnosis." The PSROs
then used regional treatment norms as a benchmark for subse-
quent reviews of the same diagnosis.
An average figure, such as a norm, could not reflect the range of
acceptable treatment practices. Many patients required longer hos-
pitalizations or more services than the norms would suggest. The
Secretary of HEW therefore directed each PSRO to use norms
flexibly and to allow physicians and hospitals some discretion in
treatment decisions according to varying patient needs. The Secre-
tary authorized the PSROs to develop patient care "standards,"
which were defined as "professionally developed expressions of the
range of acceptable variation from a norm or criterion. '78 The
standards measured the acceptable range of treatments for a par-
ticular diagnosis. The "criteria," also defined in the Manual, 79 con-
sisted of professional assessments of the services and items needed
for the optimal treatment of each patient's diagnosis.80
Many health care providers were concerned about the PSRO's
discretion to use these norms, standards and criteria as a reason to
deny federal payment for health care services. The PSRO Act gave
PSROs the authority to disapprove Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ment for medical care services and items that the PSRO found
medically unnecessary or inappropriate in its review of a patient's
76. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 68. The Manual defined "norms" as "nu-
merical and statistical measures of usual observed performance." Id. at 16.
77. See A. GOSFIELD, supra note 61, at 35. The PSRO Act specified that the National
Professional Standards Review Council would have responsibility for developing norms. In
practice, the Council merely provided a sample set of norms and criteria. The PSROs were
then free to adopt the Council's recommendations or develop alternative norms and criteria
acceptable to the Council. Id.; see also The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86
Stat. 1429, 1436 (1972).
78. See PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL, supra note 68, at 16.
79. Id.
80. See A. GOSFMLD, supra note 61, at 36. As the author notes, the PSRO program
awarded millions of dollars in contracts to professional organizations, such as the American
Medical Association, to develop PSRO criteria. Id. at 36 n.72.
A typical PSRO's review of the treatment of a heart attack patient exemplifies how
PSROs applied norms, standards and criteria. A PSRO would first look at the patient's
length of hospitalization and services received; it would then decide if the length of the
patient's hospital stay was within the PSRO standards for heart attack patients and if the
ordered services met the treatment criteria. If the patient's treatment was close enough to
the PSRO norms and it met both tests, then the physician and the provider would receive
Medicare reimbursement.
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claim.8' Congress, however, did not give the PSROs unreviewable
authority. Before an adverse determination could take effect, the
PSRO or its delegate (the hospital review committee) had to notify
the affected physician or provider of the adverse determination
and give its reasons for the payment denial. An affected party then
had the opportunity to review the matter with the PSRO. s2
The informal review of the PSRO's adverse determination gave
physicians and providers an opportunity to show that the PSRO's
determination was incorrect and not in accord with appropriate
standards. A physician or provider could also prove that it was
without fault in providing such services.8 3 If informal discussions
did not result in a reversal of the adverse determination, the PSRO
Act instructed each PSRO to notify the patient, the physician, the
provider, and the payor organization in writing regarding the de-
nial of the claim. 4 The Medicare intermediary or state Medicaid
agency, as payor, would then withhold payment unless a party re-
quested reconsideration.
The PSRO's reconsideration of an adverse determination, like
the informal review, did not have to follow a particular administra-
tive format and could be done informally.8 5 If the reimbursement
claim for PSRO reconsideration was for less than one hundred dol-
lars, the PSRO's determination following reconsideration was fi-
nal."8 If the contested claim equaled or exceeded one hundred dol-
lars, then the dissatisfied beneficiary, physician or provider could
appeal the PSRO's reconsideration decision to the Statewide Pro-
fessional Standards Review Council (SPSRC) in states which had
such a council. 7 The SPSRC's review was, in most cases, the final
81. The PSRO Act, PuB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1437 (1972).
82. Id., 86 Stat. at 1440.
83. Id., 86 Stat. at 1437; see also A. GOSFIELD, supra note 61, at 145. The "without fault"
test, known as the waiver of liability provision, prevented the PSRO from denying payment
for medical care services where the physician was unaware of the applicable PSRO norms
and criteria. In practice, the PSROs used this provision to hold the beneficiary harmless for
the care received and to give physicians and providers a "second chance" to comply with
PSRO norms and criteria. Whenever the PSRO waived liability for medically unnecessary
care, it also sent a notice of non-coverage to the physician, the provider, and the beneficiary.
In future similar situations the physician, the provider, and the beneficiary all had notice of
the PSRO-approved treatment practice and could not rely on the waiver of liability provi-
sion for payment. A. GOSFIELD, supra note 61.
84. The PSRO Act, Pua. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1437 (1972).
85. Price, supra note 68, at 386.
86. The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1437-38 (1972).
87. Id. The SPSRC consisted of a representative from each local PSRO, four other physi-
cians designated by the state medical society and state hospital association, and four per-
[Vol. 20:315
PEER REVIEW UNDER MEDICARE
appeal for denial of payment of claims. 88
In addition to individual denial of payment for claims, a PSRO
could recommend that the Secretary of HEW apply specific sanc-
tions against a physician or provider for failure to comply with
PSRO obligations.8 9 Violations that could lead to sanctions in-
cluded gross or continued overuse of services, use of services in an
unnecessarily costly manner, or inadequate assurance of the qual-
ity of services.90 After reasonable notice and opportunity for dis-
cussions between the physician or provider and the PSRO, the
PSRO would submit a report identifying program violations and
recommend sanctions to the Secretary through the SPSRC.9e
The Secretary or his designee reviewed the PSRO recommenda-
tions. If he found that the physician's or provider's violations
demonstrated an unwillingness or lack of ability to substantially
comply with PSRO obligations, he could then impose one of the
following sanctions: (1) termination of participation in the Medi-
care or Medicaid programs; (2) suspension of participation until
the Secretary found that the basis for the sanction had been re-
moved and would not recur; or (3) reimbursement to the govern-
ment for the cost, up to five thousand dollars, of the medically un-
necessary or inappropriate services.9 2
If a physician or provider wanted to challenge a proposed sanc-
tion, that party was entitled to notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before the Secretary.9 3 Judicial review of the Secretary's
sons knowledgeable in health care matters from that state and selected by the Secretary of
HEW. The SPSRC was responsible for data collection and dissemination along with review
of adverse determinations and general PSRO oversight. Id., 86 Stat. at 1440-41. Only six
states had SPSRCs during the PSRO program, in part because of funding, but also because
several states had only one PSRO and thus did not need to oversee multiple PSROs. Inter-
view with John Di Nardi, Assistant Director, Medical Society of Virginia Peer Review Or-
ganization (Feb. 26, 1985).
88. While a physician and a provider were precluded from further review, a beneficiary
could appeal the SPSRC decision to the Secretary of HEW for further administrative re-
view. See The PSRO Act, Pua. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1438 (1972). For
beneficiary claims less than $1,000, the Secretary's decision was final. For amounts in con-
troversy of $1,000 or more, the beneficiary also could seek judicial review following final
agency action by the Secretary denying the claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982) (judicial
review provisions).
89. See The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1439-40 (1972).
90. Id.; see Price, supra note 68, at 386.
91. The PSRO Act, Pua. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1439 (1972).
92. Id.
93. Id., 86 Stat. at 1440.
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final decision was also available.9 4 If the Secretary elected to ex-
clude the affected party from participation in the Medicare or
Medicaid program, the exclusion became effective after reasonable
notice to either the provider or the physician and to the public.9 5
The imposition of a fine did not require notice to the public, and
the Secretary could instruct the Medicare intermediary to deduct
the fine from any sums due the party for subsequent Medicare-
and Medicaid-funded care to program beneficiaries.9 ' The imposi-
tion of PSRO sanctions did not preempt other legal sanctions
against the physician or provider.9
3. Problems with the PSRO Approach
By creating the PSRO program, Congress tried to establish uni-
form professional standards for medical treatment. It also at-
tempted to impose cost consciousness and a uniform self-regula-
tory mechanism on a professional group highly resistant to outside
interference.9 " As the traditional independence of the physician in
making treatment decisions became subject to government scru-
tiny through PSROs, administrative and judicial conflicts resulted.
The PSRO program faced a number of organizational hurdles
that Congress failed to anticipate. The design of the PSRO pro-
gram clearly depended upon broad physician commitment and
participation in each PSRO area.9 9 In order to overcome physician
resistance to PSROs and obtain enough professional support to op-
erate the program, HEW representatives stressed the PSRO pro-
gram's quality assurance role in their communications with physi-
cian groups. 00 This "campaign" down-played the cost control
94. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(1982) (judicial review provisions).
95. The PSRO Act, PUB. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 86 Stat. 1429, 1439 (1972).
96. Id.
97. Id. Gosfield suggests that other possible actions included criminal penalties for Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud and abuse, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h (1982); state medical
and malpractice damage claims; and professional continuing education requirements as es-
tablished by regulations. See A. GOSFIELD, supra note 61, at 233 & n.28.
98. The Secretary of HEW started the PSRO program amidst an atmosphere of active
physician opposition and hostility. Individual hospitals also resisted the PSROs by using
delay tactics in negotiating memoranda of understanding and by refusing to cooperate at all.
See, e.g., Goran, Moga & Siebert, From Development to Performance: A Federal View of
PSROs, in PSRO PROMISE, supra note 21, at 8, 9.
99. See Bennett, supra note 55, at 8.
100. See, e.g., Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 12, at 41-45. The authors point out
many instances of rhetoric by HEW officials during the selling effort. On many occasions,
the official HEW positions were in direct contravention to the congressional cost control
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directive in the PSRO statute 0 1 and helped the PSRO program
obtain the necessary physician support for program implementa-
tion. However, HEW's early emphasis on quality assurance made it
difficult for the PSRO program to shift its emphasis to cost control
later. 02
Another problem that HEW experienced in implementing the
PSRO program was deciding which HEW branch would administer
the program. The control issue focused again on the cost control
and quality assurance goals of the program. 03 HEW's decision to
give the program development responsibilities to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Health (ASH) instead of the Social Secur-
ity Administration (SSA) marked a conciliatory gesture toward
physician groups. 0 4 PSRO reviews were thereby insulated from the
cost control concerns of SSA, the paying agent for the Medicare
program.105 The internal bureaucratic resistance'06 to HEW's
scheme probably contributed to the reluctance of state Medicaid
agencies to cooperate with the physician-run PSROs.10 7
Several issues related to the PSRO program also underwent judi-
cial scrutiny. Court challenges arose based on claims of a patient's
right to treatment and a physician's right to practice his or her
profession. Physician groups filed suit on behalf of patients and
physicians on several occasions, most notably in Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger (AAPS)10 8 and
in American Medical Association v. Weinberger (AMA). 0 9 The
AAPS lawsuit included fourteen separate claims for relief"0 upon
intent. Id. at 42.
101. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
102. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 12, at 44-45.
103. Id. at 41.
104. Id. Havighurst and Blumstein also note that the ASH has been an office traditionally
filled by a physician acceptable to organized medicine. Id.
105. Id.
106. Political scientists have devoted much attention in recent years to the effects of bu-
reaucratic organization and development in carrying forth legislative intent. See, e.g., J.
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).
107. Goran, Moga & Siebert, supra note 98, at 9-10.
108. 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
109. 395 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill), aff'd, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
110. One commentator organized these grounds into seven basic allegations for analysis
purposes. These allegations included claims that the PSRO law:
1) unconstitutionally limited or deprived physicians of their right to practice their
profession (argued as a fifth amendment due process right);
2) unconstitutionally deprived patients of their right to treatment through applica-
tion of PSRO norms that failed to allow for regional variations in treatment choice
1986] 335
336 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:315
which the court found that the plaintiffs either lacked standing"'
or that the challenged statute struck a reasonable balance between
the physician's rights and the government's interest in maintaining
proper health care in an economical manner." 2 The court summa-
rily dismissed as without merit the plaintiff's fifth amendment
claim of a property right in the practice of medicine. 3
The AMA suit challenged the enforcement of certain sections of
the Medicare and Medicaid Utilization Review regulations." 4 Al-
though the factual context of the AMA suit did not pertain to the
PSRO law, the constitutional issues of interference with the physi-
cian's right to practice and the patient's right to receive medical
treatment were similar to the first two issues raised in AAPS.1 5
The AMA persuaded the district court to look beyond the terms of
the regulations and to examine their practical effect on patient ac-
cess to medical care services." 6 The district court issued a prelimi-
(again argued on fifth amendment grounds);
3) unconstitutionally required disclosure of confidential information obtained
through the physician-patient relationship (argued on first and fourth amendment
grounds);
4) was arbitrary, overbroad, and not justified by any compelling state interest (ar-
gued on fifth amendment procedural due process and equal protection grounds);
5) set unconstitutionally vague duties for physicians and similarly made sanction-
ing procedures so vague as to constitute a denial of procedural due process;
6) unconstitutionally delegated peer review authority to potentially biased private
organizations; and
7) purported to change state medical malpractice law by granting physicians im-
munity for compliance with PSRO norms and criteria (argued as a source of physi-
cian liability without due process should the state law prevail).
J. BLUM, P. GERTMAN & J. RABINOW, PSROs AND THE LAW 89-95 (Aspen Systems 1977) [here-
inafter cited as PSROs AND THE LAW].
111. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. at 138, 140.
112. Id. at 132, 133, 136-37, 140, 141.
113. Id. at 139. The notion of a property right in one's profession, although suggested in
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has been severely restricted, if not eliminated, by subse-
quent decisions. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
114. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. The utilization review regulations re-
mained in force following enactment of the PSRO law. A state could satisfy its peer review
requirement, in the absence of PSROs or PROs, through this mechanism.
115. See PSROs AND THE LAW, supra note 110, at 95-98. The AMA initially sought a
preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the new Utilization Review program regula-
tions. These regulations mandated admission screening of all Medicare and Medicaid pa-
tients instead of focusing on specific admissions, such as admissions for costly procedures
thought to be of marginal benefit to patients. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
116. American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 515, 523 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The
AMA had argued in federal district court that the disputed regulations abridged a Medicare
or Medicaid beneficiary's first and ninth amendment rights to treatment in addition to the
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nary injunction based on the possibility of irreparable harm to the
health of the affected patients, which barred enforcement of the
UR regulations pending conclusion of a full trial on the merits. 117
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the order.""'
The AAPS and AMA cases reflected the continuing problems
that the PSRO program faced in obtaining physician support.
While both cases suggest that the PSRO program provisions would
survive judicial review,11 9 the AMA case did reveal judicial concern
about HEW's choice of review methods. Physician groups have re-
sorted to litigation in other instances to limit HEW's discretionary
use of its peer review authority.
2 0
After seven years of conflict, the administrative and judicial
problems with PSROs finally drew the attention of Congress. Con-
beneficiary's fifth amendment right to the protection of life, liberty and property. Id. at 517.
The AMA distinguished between preadmission certification, which it argued was repugnant
to all three amendments because of overbreadth and lack of relationship to the Utilization
Review law, and concurrent and retrospective review. The latter review mechanisms, accord-
ing to the AMA, infringed on both the physician's and the patient's first amendment rights
to freedom of communication in the treatment process. PSROs AND THE LAW, supra note
110, at 96. Blum suggests that there may be grounds for subsequent challenges to the consti-
tutionality of preadmission certification where less drastic methods of peer review are avail-
able, such as concurrent or retrospective review. Preadmission certification can interfere
with a patient's ability to obtain the type of medical treatment sought at a convenient time
and place. If a delay turned out to be life-threatening or even if the treatment proved to be
"medically necessary," then the patient and the physician could argue that the review pro-
cedure was overbroad. If a court found that the government had less invasive and less costly
review methods at its disposal, then the burden of persuasion would shift to the government
to show that the less invasive procedures had failed in the past and would be unlikely to
promote cost control and quality assurance in the future. Id. at 106-07.
117. American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. at 525. The full trial never took
place, as HEW withdrew the disputed regulations shortly thereafter. PSROs AND THE LAW,
supra note 110, at 98.
118. American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921, 927 (7th Cir. 1975).
119. Although the AMA did prevail at the preliminary injunction stage, both the district
court and the Seventh Circuit expressed skepticism that the AMA would prevail at a full
trial on the merits. Id.
120. See, e.g., Yaretsky v. Blum, No. 76 Civ. 3360 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1980) (available Oct.
10, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file). Yaretsky was another example of how
physicians and providers used the courts to limit the PSRO program's discretionary author-
ity. In Yaretsky, the district court declared that the New York State Medicaid program was
required to incorporate a court order establishing procedures for nursing home level-of-care
determinations into their peer review agreements with the local PSROs. The state's restric-
tive policies regarding nursing home utilization had been at issue in a previous suit by plain-
tiffs against the Medicaid program. The PSROs in Yaretsky unsuccessfully argued that
their subsequent memoranda of understanding with the Medicaid program were unaffected
by the prior order. The court held that the prior order did not bind the PSROs; instead, the
judgment prohibited the Medicaid agency from entering into any memoranda of under-
standing that did not include the court-ordered review procedures.
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gress was concerned, however, primarily with the cost effectiveness
of PSROs. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study of HEW's
1978 PSRO data found that PSRO program costs more than
doubled reported savings.121 The CBO report led to congressional
committee hearings122 and to a Reagan administration proposal to
gradually phase out PSRO and UR requirements altogether. 12 3
The PSRO program probably survived the initial congressional
oversight only because Congress determined that it either had to
improve or replace the program. Whenever the CBO advanced its
cost concerns regarding the PSRO program before Congress, pro-
gram proponents usually argued that elimination of the PSRO pro-
gram would increase, not decrease, federal Medicare and Medicaid
outlays.1 24 The conflicting views of PSRO effectiveness and the re-
121. PSRO Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as PSRO Effective-
ness Hearing]. Representative Philip Crane stated that, "A May 1980 CBO report reveals
that, according to 1978 data, for every dollar spent on PSRO review of Medicare patients
only $0.40 in resources were recouped .... We owe our constituents the duty of ... seri-
ously questioning the value of continuing this $193 million program automatically year after
year." Id.
122. See Proposed Phaseout of PSRO's and Utilization Review Requirements: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37,
39-40 (1981) (statement of P. Ginsburg, Chief, Income Security and Health Unit, CBO)
[hereinafter referred to as PSRO Phaseout]; see also PSRO Effectiveness Hearing, supra
note 121, at 2.
123. See PSRO Phaseout, supra note 122, at 10-16 (testimony by Dr. Carolyne Davis,
Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration).
124. See id. at 48-50 (statement of Helen Smits, M.D., Research Associate, the Urban
Institute); id. at 50-54 (statement of Jay Constantine, former Chief, Health Staff, Senate
Finance Committee). Dr. Smits argued that the PSROs could play a critical role in the
implementation of DRGs nationwide and should be preserved for that purpose. Id. at 49.
Constantine, who worked with Senator Bennett in designing the PSRO legislation, identi-
fied seven separate cost control problems with the program that were beyond the immediate
control of individual PSROs. Some of these problems included the overabundance of hospi-
tal beds, the lack of long-term institutional and home care services to meet the needs of
patients who were inappropriately hospitalized, and the paucity of reliable studies on the
cost-effectiveness of PSROs. Constantine also argued that the CBO's cost-shifting thesis on
PSROs was analytically improper because the CBO does not consider any additional indi-
rect costs to taxpayers from government action when analyzing other federal programs. Con-
stantine concluded his remarks by highlighting the continuing viability of the program's
purpose:
The expenditure of some $80 billion in taxpayer dollars for Medicare and Medicaid
continues to require accountable trusteeship and prudent payment of those funds for
the care of the poor and the elderly.
Reasonable controls-such as professional review-are integral to fulfilling those
responsibilities. A poor PSRO should be promptly replaced-but you should not, be-
cause of individual poor performance, condemn the group or the concept.
It seems to me that given our experience thus far, the question for the broad-brush,
penny-wise and pound-foolish critics of professional review is to answer: What have
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sults from private review initiatives125 eventually led Congress to
develop a plan for phasing out PSROs and replacing them with a
new peer review model.126
III. THE UTILIZATION AND QUALITY CONTROL PEER REVIEW
ORGANIZATION (PRO) PROGRAM
A. Program Development and Legislative History
Congress enacted the PRO program as an accompanying subtitle
to the Medicare prospective payment amendments.127 The new
program reflected congressional dissatisfaction with the effective-
you got that's better, believable and workable?
Id. at 52-54.
125. During the 1970's, RAND received HEW approval to organize a statewide health
insurance experiment in New Mexico that included a private, voluntary peer review pro-
gram for Medicaid services. See R. BROOK, K WILLIAMS & J. ROLPH, CONTROLLING THE USE
AND COST OF MEDICAL CARL_ THE NEW Maxico EXPERiMENTAL MEDICAL CARE REVIEW OR-
GANIZATION-A FOUR-YEAR CASE STUDY (1980). The RAND project ("EMCRO") was a vol-
untary peer review effort that relied heavily on the cooperation and assistance of local phy-
sicians, the Medicare intermediary, and the state Medicaid program. Although the project
only reviewed claims for services billed to Medicaid, the EMCRO's review authority was
more comprehensive than a PSRO's. The EMCRO reviewed Medicaid beneficiary utilization
in the hospital, nursing home, and ambulatory settings. Id. at 69.
Although the RAND demonstration project encouraged voluntary physician participation,
the project was conspicuously ineffective in controlling Medicaid program costs. The study's
findings showed that, with the exception of injections, the use of services per Medicaid-
eligible recipient per month in all age categories increased over time and the per capita
medical expenditures for the study group rose faster than the national average for analogous
services. There was no perceptible change in hospital utilization over time despite the pro-
gram's emphasis on use of ambulatory services. Id. at 70.
These results can be explained by arguing that the Medicaid-eligible population in the
survey was substantially underserved prior to 1971. However, the authors of the study con-
tend that the results show that peer review, by itself, cannot meaningfully reduce medical
care expenditures. Id. at 73. Other commentators argued that PSROs could not be held
accountable for the continuing escalation in federal health care expenditures because there
was no direct relationship between hospital utilization and hospital reimbursement under
Medicare or Medicaid during the 1970's. See W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INITIATIVE
IN PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS (PSRO): FINAL REPORT vi (1978).
126. See The Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, PUn. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 143, 96
Stat. 392 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-12 (1982 & Supp. I
1983)). Congress also addressed Medicare utilization and program costs in creating the
Medicare prospective payment system for hospitals. See The Social Security Amendments
of 1983, PUB. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983) (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.). The per-case payment for Medicare patients reduced congressional reli-
ance on peer review programs to control Medicare costs. See supra notes 23-32 and accom-
panying text.
127. See The Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, PU. L. No. 97-248, tit. I, § 143, 96
Stat. 392 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-12 (1982 & Supp. I
1983)).
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ness of the PSRO program in controlling unnecessary utilization of
hospital services. 128 Congress gave PROs many of the same review
functions as PSROs, intending to preserve the beneficial aspects of
the PSRO program. Further, Congress wanted individual PSROs
that were successful in the area of cost control to apply for PRO
designation. 2 '
Congress made very few substantive changes in the PSRO Act
when it created the PRO program. The PRO statute did eliminate
the availability of delegated review, a provision that was widely
viewed as a source of inconsistent results in previous peer review
programs. 130 Other provisions of the PRO Act, such as the designa-
tion of individual PROs, paralleled the procedures followed under
the PSRO program.' 3' The areas of particular concern to physi-
cians, providers and patients, namely the PRO review criteria and
the PRO appeals and sanctions process, are discussed in sequence
in the next section.
128. See S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781, 817 (Senate Finance Comm. report).
129. Id. at 817.
130. Historically, the Utilization Review program and the PSRO program had relied
heavily upon intra-hospital utilization review committees to perform many of the peer re-
view functions. The delegation of review authority was a convenient way for under-staffed
PSROs to carry out their mandate. However, there was an inherent conflict of interest in
asking a hospital-based physician's group to determine the medical necessity of a particular
hospital patient's care. As Constantine stated, an internal committee's decision that patient
care was unnecessary would be "contrary to the economic interests of the hospital and asso-
ciates on the medical staff. There is an in-house incentive to use the facility's beds and
services. The reference points on which such judgments are made are often too narrow and
requisite expertise lacking ... ." PSRO Phaseout, supra note 122, at 51 (statement by Jay
Constantine).
Other persons applauded Congress' decision to eliminate the delegated review loophole in
the PSRO law in 42 U.S.C. § 3120c-4(e) (1976). See PSRO Proposals, supra note 39, at 110
(statement of Willis Goldbeck, Executive Director, Washington Business Group on Health).
But see id. at 215-16 (statement of the American Hospital Association) ("Utilization review
is most effective when incorporated in the education of medical staff. Professionals are more
receptive to the findings from quality assurance activities when these activities are per-
formed by the hospital and its medical staff."). The American Hospital Association also
indicated that its member hospitals were required to perform utilization review for both
ethical reasons and for JCAH accreditation. Therefore, the new rules required the PROs to
duplicate the internal activities of hospitals. See id. at 213-14.
131. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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B. PRO Act Changes in the Peer Review Process
1. PRO Review of Physician DRG Designations and Patient
Admissions
The new prospective payment system under Medicare132 elimi-
nates many of the incentives to provide more services to hospital
patients, the object of much review activity by PSROs. The DRG
admission code payment method provides a fixed fee per admission
and thereby automatically limits the amount of compensated care
provided for each patient admission.133 However, the Medicare in-
termediaries that pay hospitals the DRG rates cannot specify the
number of times a patient can be admitted, nor do they oversee
the DRG designation selected. Adoption of the DRG payment sys-
tem thereby created a new role for peer review groups.3 The
PROs now validate the accuracy of diagnoses and review the ap-
propriateness of the admission and the quality of care provided to
each patient when a claim for reimbursement is submitted.135
The early implementation of the PRO program mirrored the
slow development of the PSRO program. 36 The Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA), the agency responsible for pro-
gram organization, did not release its request for contract propos-
als from eligible organizations until February 29, 1984,11 and
designation of individual PROs did not begin until mid-1984. At
that time, HCFA's only guidance to designated PROs in their ne-
132. See supra notes 26 & 29 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. See also PSRO Phaseout, supra note 122, at 49 (statement of Helen Smits, M.D.)
(suggesting the need for peer review as the Medicare system moves from cost-based to per-
case reimbursement).
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1) (1982) (PRO review responsibilities); PRO Review Re-
sponsibility Rules, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,312 & 15,330 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 466).
136. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has moved very slowly in devel-
oping regulations to cover PRO admissions review and DRG validation procedures. Al-
though HCFA released final regulations for PRO geographic areas and contractor eligibility
on February 27, 1984, see PRO Area Designations and Definitions of Eligible Organizations,
49 Fed. Reg. 7202 (1984), the final rules on PRO review and sanction responsibilities were
not released until April 17, 1985. See PRO Review Responsibility Rules, supra note 135.
137. The PRO contracts with HCFA were based on successful responses by contract ap-
plicants within each PRO geographic area to a HCFA Request for Proposal. See Request for
Proposal (RFP) No. HCFA-84-015 for the Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Org.
Health Care Fin. Admin. 62 (Feb. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as PRO RFP]. The RFP in-
cludes three sections (Articles I-Scope of Work, VIII-Technical Direction, and IX - Con-
ditions of Performance) that require the PRO contractor to conduct its review activities in
accordance with PRO program regulations (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 462-76) and PSRO and
PRO program directives.
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gotiations with hospitals consisted of information in the PRO con-
tract and in PSRO and PRO program directives.138 Because hospi-
tals were under pressure to enter into Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) with PROs by November 15, 1984, or risk
the loss of Medicare funds,139 the administrative delays in
designating PROs and issuing final rules for PRO operation con-
tributed to a growing sense of urgency and impending confronta-
tion among hospital groups.
140
The Virginia PRO program's experience is typical of many PROs
across the country. HCFA refused to accept the Medical Society of
Virginia Review Organization's (MSVRO) first proposal in re-
sponse to the HCFA Request For Proposal.' 4 ' After revising its ad-
missions objectives, MSVRO submitted its proposal and was desig-
nated as the statewide PRO on October 3, 1984.142 The designation
date left a mere forty-three days for Virginia hospitals to negotiate
MOU agreements with MSVRO or risk the loss of eligibility for
Medicare funds.' 43
Following HCFA designation and the development of MOUs,
138. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, Health Care Fin. Admin. (Aug. 3, 1984) [herein-
after cited as PRO Program Directive No. 2]; PSRO Program Transmittal Nos. 107 & 108,
Health Care Fin. Admin. (Sept. 1983). HHS Secretary Heckler's failure to submit the sub-
stantive content of these rules to notice and comment rulemaking pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act prompted the American Hospital Association to petition HHS for
rulemaking. See American Hospital Association Petition for Rulemaking for Promulgation
of Regulations Implementing the Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982 (Oct. 10, 1984).
The AHA reportedly has filed suit to force HHS to use notice and comment rulemaking.
Interview with John Di Nardi, Assistant Director, MSVRO (Feb. 27, 1985).
139. See The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). The
1984 Act extended the deadline for PRO-hospital agreements by amending § 1866(a)(1)(F)
of the Social Security Act which, pursuant to title IV of the Social Security Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 414 (1983), had set a deadline of October 1, 1984, for all
MOUs.
140. See Implementation of PRO's for Medicare: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1984) (statement of Alan
Nelson, M.D., AMA); see also id. at 116-18 (statement of the AHA); id. at 141 (statement of
the Federation of American Hospitals).
141. Address by Robert Morton, President, MSVRO, at a Virginia Hospital Association
Meeting on Negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with a Professional Review Or-
ganization, in Richmond, Virginia (Oct. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as VHA-PRO
Conference].
142. Id.
143. See supra note 139. The MSVRO also had a 30-day deadline for becoming opera-
tional following PRO designation by HCFA. See American Hospital Association, Medicare
Policy: Peer Review Organizations-Special Briefing Supplement on Negotiating Hospital-
PRO Agreements 2 (July 1984) [hereinafter cited as AHA Briefing Supplement]. The end
result of these deadlines was a frantic rush to negotiate a uniform MOU between the
MSVRO and the VHA.
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each PRO began to perform reviews of area hospital services as
specified in its PRO contract with HCFA. The MSVRO contract
included three "admissions" objectives and five "quality" objec-
tives.'4 These objectives required: (1) preadmission review of pro-
cedures that, in the PRO's view, could be performed on an outpa-
tient basis; 145 (2) pre-procedure review of specific DRGs covering
elective surgical procedures;' 46 (3) retrospective review of every ad-
mission by particular hospitals or physicians identified as generat-
ing a significant pattern of unnecessary patient admissions; 47 (4)
retrospective review of all readmissions; (5) review of medical
records for patients given particular drugs to check for toxic reac-
tions; (6) retrospective review of all hospitals whose acute myocar-
dial infarction mortality rates exceed twenty-four percent; (7) de-
velopment of practice norms for gastrointestinal endoscopic
procedures and review of claims submitted by physicians perform-
ing these procedures unnecessarily; and (8) reviews of patient
144. See MSVRO Contract, HCFA No. 500-0038, at 18-25 [hereinafter cited as MSVRO
Contract].
145. The MSVRO Board of Directors identified 54 procedures, based on Blue Cross and
PSRO experience, that are often performed on an inpatient basis. In the Board's opinion,
these procedures usually could be performed safely and effectively on an outpatient basis.
MSVRO designed the preadmission screening program to weed out those procedures that
could be performed in an ambulatory setting. Id. at 18.
'146. The MSVRO Board reviewed the top 20 surgical procedures for Virginia Medicare
patients and found that the incidence of surgery in six DRG groups had increased by 16.5%
between 1982 and 1983. The Board decided that the non-emergency cases within these
DRGs were appropriate for preadmission certification. Id. at 19; see also Lipp, The Effect of
the Prospective Payment System on Hospital QA/UR Systems, 10 Q. REv. BULL. 283, 287
(1984) (review of surgery and potential for suits by patients); Medicare Agencies Now Judg-
ing Surgery, Rich. Times Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1984, at 1, col. 4 (report on testimony at a con-
gressional subcommittee hearing regarding preadmission review of surgery).
147. The MSVRO Board has set an overall retrospective review goal of reducing inappro-
priate or unnecessary admissions and invasive procedures by 85%. The Board also wants to
reduce readmissions by 90%. MSVRO plans to perform retrospective review of all admis-
sions by physicians and hospitals which continue to overadmit patients. MSVRO Contract,
supra note 144, at 20. Each PRO must perform retrospective review of all admissions within
each review category, see infra note 160 and accompanying text, where a provider's unneces-
sary admissions per category exceed 2.5% of the provider's Medicare admissions reviewed
by the PRO. See Dep't of Health and Human Services, Peer Review Organization Manual,
Health Care Fin. Admin., Attachment A-1 (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter cited as PRO Manual];
American Hospital Association, Medicare Policy: Peer Review Organizations-Special Brief-
ing on PRO Implementation and Medical Review Requirements 4 (July 1984) [hereinafter
cited as AHA on PROs]. PSROs used to calculate the 2.5% favorable presumption by refer-
ence to all Medicare patient admissions, not just those subject to review. PRO use of the
new formula will lead to more 100% retrospective reviews and additional adverse determi-
nations. See Implementation of Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. of Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87
(statement of Jack W. Owen, AHA) [hereinafter cited as PRO Hearing I1].
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profiles in cases of avoidable post-operative complications so as to
identify quality of care concerns of the physician and hospital. 48
The MSVRO established a preadmission review plan that be-
came effective on December 1, 1984, and includes a toll-free tele-
phone number for physicians seeking admission certification for
patient procedures falling under the plan. 49 Non-physician review
analysts respond to the calls and determine whether the proposed
admission meets the PRO norms and criteria. 150 If the admission
falls within the criteria and is therefore medically justifiable, the
PRO sends a letter to the Medicare intermediary and the attend-
ing physician.' 5 ' The letter explains the reasons for admitting the
patient and authorizes the Medicare intermediary to pay the phy-
sician and the hospital for the admission.
52
Where a proposed admission does not meet the preadmission
criteria, the review analyst will refer the case to a consulting physi-
cian for a determination. 3 After reviewing the certification infor-
mation and obtaining any clarification from the attending physi-
cian,'5 4 the consulting physician may decide that the admission is
not medically justifiable. In such cases, the PRO sends a letter of
adverse determination to the physician and the Medicare interme-
diary.155 Any subsequent admission for that procedure will not re-
ceive Medicare payment.
Each month, MSVRO representatives travel to hospitals across
Virginia in order to check the MSVRO's preadmission review
records for consistency with the hospital's treatment records. 5
148. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 4-6 (general PRO objectives
followed by MSVRO).
149. See MSVRO Memorandum of Understanding with the Virginia Hospital Association
15 (June 1985) [hereinafter cited as June 1985 MOU]; MSVRO Contract, supra note 144, at
supp. 2-3 (Plan for Preadmission Review).
150. See MSVRO Contract, supra note 144, at supp. 3-3.
151. Id. at supp. 3-3 to 3-4.
152. Id.
153. Id. at supp. 3-3.
154. Id. at supp. 3-3 to 3-4.
155. Id. at supp. 3-4.
156. Id. There are other issues associated with the performance of retrospective reviews
that are also controversial. First, there can be no provision in PRO contracts with hospitals
for payment of additional compliance costs associated with the intensified review. Although
hospital DRG rates include some moneys for peer review functions, the increased copying
costs and clerical time required for assisting PROs in performing on-site and off-site reviews
far exceed the current peer review allowance. Many hospitals have objected to the addi-
tional costs; however, the PROs have no funds in their HCFA contracts to cover these ex-
penses. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 2; AHA Briefing Supplement,
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The MSVRO representative also reviews all treatment records for
DRGs requiring preadmission certification to ensure that the hos-
pital's physicians actually called the PRO before admitting the pa-
tient. The MSVRO physician consultant reviews any discrepancies
between the two records identified by review analysts and may rec-
ommend a letter of adverse determination if he finds a discrepancy
that cannot be satisfactorily resolved. 157 The MSVRO also has pro-
cedures for mandatory meetings with recalcitrant physicians and,
in such cases, may perform full concurrent or retrospective reviews
of a physician's Medicare patient admissions.'58 The MSVRO also
may recommend that the Secretary of HHS impose formal sanc-
tions on physicians that consistently refuse to cooperate. 159
Each month, the MSVRO review analyst also must look at treat-
ment records for many of the hospital's non-preadmission review
patients. The HCFA-PRO contracts require each PRO to perform
retrospective reviews of the appropriateness of all cardiac pace-
maker implantations, all readmissions, all inpatient transfers from
one hospital to another, all hospital admissions where the hospital
is experiencing unusually large increases in volume, and one out of
every twenty admissions not otherwise under review."1 0 The review
analyst must validate the DRG admission codes for patients sub-
ject to preadmission and retrospective reviews and must also check
the DRG codes for an additional five percent of the other Medicare
patients admitted.' 6'
supra note 143, at 7-8.
A second issue is the confidentiality of patient and physician records. Confidentiality was
of particular concern during the PSRO program when a federal district court ruled that a
PSRO's confidential, physician-specific data were accessible under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. The D.C. Circuit eventually reversed the lower court by holding that the PSROs
do not fit the definition of a federal agency. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). The PRO statute follows the D.C. Circuit's opinion and specifically excludes the
PROs from FOIA requests. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a) (1982). However, the same section may
allow PRO data to be discoverable in malpractice suits. See Hastings, supra note 65, at 295-
99; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 15,353-54 (1985) (HCFA comments).
157. See MSVRO Contract, supra note 144, at supp. 3-4; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 15,331 &
15,333 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 466.78, .88) (final rules on PRO inspection of
hospital records).
158. See MSVRO Contract, supra note 144, at 20.
159. See id. at supp. 3-4; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 15,333 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
466.90) (final rule regarding lack of provider cooperation).
160. See AHA on PROs, supra note 147, at 3-4.
161. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 4. During the DRG validation
process, the PRO review analyst compares the diagnostic and procedures coding on the pa-
tient's bill with the diagnoses and procedures recorded in the patient's treatment record.
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Finally, the MSVRO review analyst must examine hospital
claims to DRG outlier cases 1 2 to see if the patient days or services
beyond those authorized under the DRG admission code are medi-
cally appropriate. 6 3 In the case of cost outliers, a hospital is nor-
mally entitled to additional Medicare funds if it is able to prove
that it incurred extraordinarily high costs in treating a particular
patient.14 Outlier reviews include a procedure for notifying the
hospital and the Medicare intermediary of any necessary adjust-
ment in DRG coding. 6 5
The PRO or its non-provider subcontractor then must perform
its own analyses of these various admissions criteria. MSVRO out-
lined its responsibility to perform admission criteria analyses on
Medicare patients in its initial MOU with Virginia hospitals.'66 A
MOU also may give a PRO access to non-Medicare patient records
so that PROs may contract to perform reviews for other organiza-
tions, including Medicaid."" The PRO staff must perform all of
The PRO review analyst also determines if the DRG coding is in fact supported by the
patient's medical record data and if the physician has attested to its accuracy. See 50 Fed.
Reg. 15,330-31 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 466.70).
The physician attestation requirements have been particularly controversial. The PRO
Manual requires attending physicians to sign a certification statement contained in each
Medicare patient's medical record attesting to the accuracy of primary and secondary diag-
noses and major procedures performed. The admitting hospital also must have on file a
signed acknowledgement by the physician that he has received the following notice:
Notice to Physicians: Medicare payment to hospitals is based in part on each pa-
tient's principal and secondary diagnoses and the major procedures performed on the
patient, as attested to by the patient's attending physician by virtue of his or her
signature in the medical record. Anyone who misrepresents, falsifies, or conceals as-
sential information required for payment of Federal funds, may be subject to fine,
imprisonment, or civil penalty under applicable Federal laws.
PRO Manual, supra note 147, at 40.
These attestation requirements have created administrative problems for hospitals and
have led to inadvertent denials. The MSVRO, responding to VHA concerns, has allowed
hospitals a reasonable opportunity to supply missing attestations prior to notifying the in-
termediary of an adverse determination. See June 1985 MOU, supra note 149, at 15,
162. See supra note 31 (definition of "day" and "cost" outliers).
163. See PRO Manual, supra note 147, at 31-37.
164. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 5. A hospital also may be
entitled to receive additional funds for day outliers if a patient requires a level of medical
care for a period of time exceeding the outlier threshold for a particular diagnosis. Id.
165. Id.
166. See MSVRO Memorandum of Understanding with the Virginia Hospital Association
6-8 (Nov. 1, 1984). This MOU has been superseded by a more detailed description of PRO
review responsibilities. See June 1985 MOU, supra note 149.
167. See PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 7. As of February, 1985, 14
organizations had contracts or were negotiating contracts with the MSVRO to perform peer
review on non-Medicare patients. The VHA has sent guidelines to all Virginia hospitals to
assist them in the negotiation of private review MOUs. See Memorandum to VHA Institu-
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the review functions except for quality of care reviews."' 8 A PRO
may subcontract for quality of care reviews with hospital utiliza-
tion review committees if HCFA approves the delegation
proposals. 69
2. The PRO Appeals Procedure
The PRO statute and regulations provide general guidelines for
denial of payment and for sanctions procedures. The review proce-
dures discussed above require PROs to make adverse determina-
tions where a Medicare beneficiary receives medical care services
that do not satisfy the statutory tests of medical necessity, quality,
and appropriateness of care.170 The PRO must deny payment in
such cases to both physicians and hospitals unless the waiver of
liability provisions' or other allowances apply.1 2 The PRO must
also give the physician and the hospital an opportunity to discuss a
proposed adverse determination and the patient's condition with
the PRO before the PRO can make the initial denial. 1 3 Normally,
the PRO must make adverse decisions within thirty days of the
tional Members on VHA Guidance on Private Review (Feb. 15, 1985).
168. PRO Program Directive No. 2, supra note 138, at 8.
169. Id.
170. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-3(a)(1) to -3(a)(2) (1982). One PRO reported that it has de-
nied payment in seven percent of the cases it has reviewed to date. See PRO Hearing II,
supra note 147, at 79 (statement of Harry Weeks, M.D., Medical Director, West Virginia
Medical Institute). By contrast, Virginia has the fifth lowest payment denial rate in the
country. Interview with Katherine Webb, Vice President of the Virginia Hospital Associa-
tion (Dec. 4, 1985).
171. See AHA on PROs, supra note 147, at 6 (availability of a "favorable presumption"
regarding payment for unnecessary admissions or procedures, unless the hospital or physi-
cian knew or should have known that the admission or procedure was unnecessary); see also
supra notes 83 & 147 and accompanying text.
In certain instances, the PRO presumes that actions by the physician or provider are
deliberate efforts to circumvent the DRG payment system, and the waiver of liability provi-
sions are inapplicable. If a physician or provider inappropriately discharges a patient and
shortly thereafter readmits the same patient, the PRO must deny payment for the second
admission. Similarly, the PRO must deny payment where a patient is transferred from a
level of care covered by the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) to a PPS-exempt
level of care (such as acute psychiatric care). See PRO Manual Transmittal No. 5, Health
Care Fin. Admin., §§ 3010, 3015 (Aug. 1985), reprinted in MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuME
(CCH) 34,840 (1984).
As a method of reducing Medicare costs and unnecessary medical care, Congress has cre-
ated several peer review systems to review physician and hospital treatment practices.
172. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(2) (1982) (includes payment for two days of inpa-
tient care beyond the DRG rate; allows patients and physicians to arrange for post-dis-
charge care in limited circumstances).
173. Id. § 1320c-3(a)(3).
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date that the hospital files the claim. However, HCFA can approve
subsequent denials in special cases.17 4
Any physician, hospital, or beneficiary who is dissatisfied with an
adverse determination may request reconsideration of the initial
decision within sixty days of receipt of the written denial notice.
75
A dissatisfied party also may obtain a speedy review of a preadmis-
sion review denial if it files a request for reconsideration within
three working days of a beneficiary's receipt of the PRO's denial
notice.17  The beneficiary may obtain pertinent portions of his or
her medical record during the reconsideration process, and any
party may submit additional information for consideration by the
reviewer. 1' Late filing of a request for reconsideration or a hearing
is allowed if good cause is shown.
7 8
The final regulations require the PRO to use a different consult-
ing physician for the initial denial and the reconsideration review.
This goes beyond the language of both the statute and the pro-
posed rule which recommended only that, "to the extent practica-
ble," the reconsideration should be performed by a different physi-
cian.17 9 This adds an element of impartiality to the review process.
The reviewer must send a written notice to the parties that ex-
plains the basis and rationale for the reconsideration decision and
which should also contain information on the Medicare payment
consequences of the reconsideration and the beneficiary's appeal
rights. 80 The reconsidered determination is final and binding on
all parties unless appealed or reopened,' s ' and the PRO must
maintain the reconsideration record for at least four years or until
all appeal rights have been exhausted. 2
174. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,334 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 466.96) (final rule on
review period for denials includes provisions for reopening determinations for up to four
years in case of new evidence or reviewer/clerical errors; also provides for the reopening of
fraudulent determinations at any time).
175. See id. at 15,372 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.20).
176. See id. at 15,372-73. The PRO must conduct preadmission review reconsiderations
within three working days if received within the three-day period; otherwise a PRO may
reconsider cases within 30 days. See id. at 15,373 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.32).
177. See id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.28).
178. See id. at 15,372 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.20).
179. See id. at 15,373 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.28). The MSVRO also agreed to
use different physician consultants for initial reviews and reconsiderations. See June 1985
MOU, supra note 149, at 28.
180. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,373 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.34).
181. See id. at 15,374 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.38).
182. See id. at 15,373-74 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.36).
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A physician or hospital may appeal a waiver of liability determi-
nation, 183 but only the beneficiary may assert his or her right to
appeal an adverse determination following reconsideration. How-
ever, the PRO's determination following reconsideration is final for
all reimbursement claims of less than two hundred dollars.8 4
Where the amount in controversy'85 equals or exceeds two hundred
dollars, a Medicare beneficiary may seek review of the adverse de-
termination by an administrative law judge.8 " A subsequent ad-
ministrative appeal to the Appeals Council is also possible.87 The
Appeals Council's decision on all claims for less than two thousand
dollars is final. If the amount in controversy equals or exceeds two
thousand dollars, a beneficiary then may seek judicial review of the
final administrative decision. 8
The PRO's denial of Medicare payment for a physician or a hos-
pital in individual cases can lead to future penalties. Possible pen-
alties range from a shifting of the burden of proof in waiver of
liability determinations' 9 to formal sanctions against the pro-
vider, 190 which may include monetary penalties and temporary ex-
clusion from the Medicare program. '
The PRO sanctions process differs significantly from the PSRO
process in that a PRO is now required to initiate sanction proceed-
ings if a physician or provider exhibits a pattern of unnecessary
utilization in a substantial number of cases. 192 The PRO regula-
tions do require that the physician or provider receive notice prior
to an initial sanction determination 93 and provide for an opportu-
nity to take voluntary corrective action.194 However, where a viola-
tion is found to be "gross and flagrant," the PRO must bypass the
183. See id. at 15,372 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.14(c)).
184. See id. at 15,374 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 473.40).
185. See id. (to be codified at 42 CF.R. § 473.44).
186. See id. (to be codified at 42 C.FR. § 473.40).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1982).
188. Id.
189. See AHA on PROs, supra note 147, at 6.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(1) (1982).
191. Id.
192. Id. The final PRO rules defined the term "substantial violation in a substantial num-
ber of cases" as "a pattern of care [which] has been provided that is inappropriate, unneces-
sary, or does not meet recognized professional standards of care, or is not supported by the
necessary documentation of care as required by the PRO." See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,344 (1985)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 474.0(b)); PRO Manual Transmittal No. 6, Health Care Fin.
Admin., § 6010A (Oct. 1985) [hereinafter cited as PRO Transmittal No. 6].
193. See PRO Transmittal No. 6, supra note 192, § 6015A.
194. Id. § 6015 B. Such corrective action must be taken in accordance with a written plan.
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initial notice and opportunity for corrective action and make an
immediate, initial sanction determination. 195 In either case, if the
physician or provider does not satisfactorily respond within thirty
calendar days of the initial determination, the PRO must notify
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of HHS to initiate for-
mal sanctions.'96
The physician or provider has thirty days to submit any addi-
tional, specific information to OIG regarding the sanction recom-
mendation. 97 The OIG review is limited to determining whether:
(1) a violation occurred; (2) a physician or provider has demon-
strated an unwillingness or inability to substantially comply with a
peer review obligation; and (3) the PRO has followed proper proce-
dures.198 The OIG assumes that if the PRO has followed the above
procedures, the review has been reasonably performed, 99 and there
is no subsequent inquiry into any underlying factors prompting the
sanction recommendation.
The critical difference between the PSRO and PRO procedures
is that, in the case of program exclusions, the PRO recommenda-
tion will take effect automatically if the OIG fails to act within 120
days.200 Monetary penalties still require OIG review and approval
of the PRO recommendation. 20 1 As with the PSRO program, the
affected party can obtain further administrative or federal district
court review of final sanctions. 2
195. See id. § 6020A; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(1)(1983). The PRO rules define the
term "gross and flagrant violation" as "a violation of an obligation [which] has occurred in
one or more instances [and] which presents an imminent danger to the health, safety or
well-being of a Medicare beneficiary." 50 Fed. Reg. 15,344 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
§ 474.0(b)); see also PRO Transmittal No. 6, supra note 192, § 6010A.
A panel at a recent HCFA conference on the PRO program decided that one occurrence of
a particular PRO violation might constitute "a gross and flagrant" violation if sufficiently
extreme. In most cases, however, at least three violations would be necessary before formal
action is taken. See Sax, Peer Review Organizations May Increase Inspector General's
Sanction Activity, 8 HEALTH L. VIGIL 15, 16 (1985).
196. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,345 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 474.36); PRO Transmit-
tal No. 6, supra note 192, §§ 6015C, 6020A.
197. See PRO Transmittal No. 6, supra note 192, §§ 6015E, 6020C, 6030.
198. See id. § 6035B.
199. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,339 (1985) (commenting on the scope of OIG review of PRO
evidentiary findings).
200. See id. at 15,346 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 474.42).
201. Id.
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b)(4) (1982); see also notes 93-94 and accompanying text
(PSRO sanction appeal provisions).
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C. Potential Problems with the PRO Program
1. Use of Review Criteria
As with the PSRO program, the PRO's use of general review cri-
teria in its medical necessity and level of care determinations can
lead to arbitrary results in individual cases. The PROs still use
PSRO norms and criteria to establish unnecessary admission
targets. 0 3 However, under Medicare prospective payment, PROs
no longer use diagnosis-specific norms and criteria to establish rea-
sonable costs for patient stays and ancillary procedures.2 4 The
*PRO program must, nonetheless, develop and rely upon specific
criteria for preadmission certifications and DRG outlier reviews.
The preadmission review criteria merit particular scrutiny in
light of American Medical Association v. Weinberger.2 " If the cer-
tification process places patients in jeopardy of receiving inade-
quate care, then the regulation may violate a patient's constitu-
tional right to treatment20 or the physician's statutory right of
noninterference with the practice of medicine.20 7 However, the
likelihood of patient harm from preadmission screening of a lim-
ited number of elective procedures is considerably less than the
threat posed by the concurrent review of all admissions, the sub-
ject of controversy in the AMA case.
The use of arbitrary, uncirculated review criteria by non-physi-
cians to deny admissions or outlier payments might also pose sig-
nificant health risks to Medicare patients. However, the MSVRO,
like most PROs, has agreed to provide its review criteria for
preadmission screening to hospitals and physicians on a timely ba-
sis. 2 08 Making the criteria accessible and ensuring the active partic-
ipation of the consulting physician in any denial decision should
eliminate most physician and provider concerns about the PRO's
use of norms and criteria, as long as any changes in review criteria
are made available prior to their use in review decisions.20 9 How-
203. Cf. 50 Fed. Reg. 15,334-35 (1985) (to be codified at 42 CYFR § 466.100) (final rule on
use of norms and criteria).
204. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
205. 395 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. 1ll.), aff'd, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975); see supra notes 114-
20 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 110, 116 and accompanying text.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1982).
208. See June 1985 MOU, supra note 149, at 10.
209. See Memorandum to VHA Institutional Members on PRO Review Activi-
ties-Problems and Solutions 3 (June 28, 1985) (reporting MSVRO agreement to inform
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ever, PRO reviewer bias or lack of expertise in a particular medical
discipline could still be a basis for legal challenges to the denial of
admission or payment in individual cases.21
2. The Appeals and Sanctions Process
The new payment denial and sanctions process provides PROs
with considerably more power with which to deal with recalcitrant
providers than was available to PSROs. As one HCFA official
stated, "Adverse determinations will become more common-
place."'2 1' One may anticipate an additional number of sanctions
proceedings, too, as physicians and providers intentionally try to
obtain longer hospital stays through improper DRG coding or ad-
ditional admissions.21 2 Unfortunately, the same trap may apply to
the inadvertent physician or provider, who may not understand
how a couple of coding errors or patient readmissions could lead to
sanction proceedings.
The PROs can exercise a considerable amount of discretion in
their physician and provider sanction reviews.213 Although final
sanctions are subject to appeal, there is no meaningful appeal from
adverse determinations which preceded and were incorporated into
the sanctions process. The PRO's discretion in recommending
sanctions will create conflicts between PROs, physicians, and prov-
iders over patient treatment unless the parties involved adhere to
hospitals prior to use of new criteria).
210. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,334-35 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 466.96, .98, .102);
see also Sax, supra note 195, at 17 (discussing need to raise procedural objections at the
earliest opportunity).
211. Interview with Bill Davis, Assistant to the Regional Administrator, HCFA (Oct. 16,
1984).
212. Under the Medicare prospective payment system, the amount of payment is directly
related to the DRG code selected for each patient admission. Physicians and providers have
undoubtedly realized that it is in their best interests to select those DRG categories that
enhance their Medicare payments and to emphasize the relevant aspects of each admission
supportive of their DRG selection. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. In order
to guard against such potential abuses, HCFA requires PROs to validate DRO selections
and to treat some patient readmissions and transfers as deliberate attempts to circumvent
the prospective payment system. See supra note 171. However, these safeguards are not
foolproof and can lead to sanction proceedings in cases of inadvertent errors or good faith
efforts to comply with the law.
213. For example, one PRO may decide that a failure to adequately document in the
medical record the reasons for admitting a patient is a "substantial violation" while another
PRO, or the same PRO under similar circumstances, may determine it to be a "gross and
flagrant violation." See PRO Transmittal No. 6, supra note 192, at 12-9 to 12-15, 12-19 to
12-22.
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standard treatment and recordkeeping practices.
Further, there are no statutes or regulations which define the
terms "substantial number of cases" or "gross and flagrant viola-
tions."2 "4 Left undefined, these terms can become a problem for
the well-intentioned provider during a sanction proceeding where
two adverse determinations could be substantial and many prob-
lem types could be classified as gross and flagrant. The existence of
PRO bias and prejudice toward a particular provider could also go
unnoticed during a sanctions process. These conflicts arise from
the PRO's discretionary authority in the peer review process and
will be the likely subjects of congressional hearings and litigation
in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress created the Medicare peer review systems as a means
of controlling Medicare program costs while maintaining the qual-
ity of patient care. While the method of peer review under Medi-
care has changed considerably since Congress enacted the Utiliza-
tion Review program in 1965, the individual treatment practices of
physicians have remained the major focus of the current PRO pro-
gram. Physicians retain substantial control over the choice of
treatment; however, the new Medicare review entities have greater
discretion in denying payment for a beneficiary's care and in pe-
nalizing physicians and hospitals for inappropriate care.
The PRO has become an important mechanism for controlling
costs under the new prospective payment system, if only because
the DRG rates alter hospital payment incentives. Now that most
hospitals receive a flat rate for each type of patient admission, hos-
pitals are pressuring physicians to discharge patients earlier and to
order fewer ancillary services. Prospective payment thus controls
the unit cost of a patient day in the hospital. Unless a hospital has
claims for outlier payments, a PRO does not have to approve addi-
tional patient days or services. The PRO can now focus its review
activities on admission control and quality maintenance. As a con-
sequence, the PRO reviews may spot more instances of inappropri-
ate or unnecessary care, leading to more denials of payment and
provider sanctions than under its predecessor programs.
214. See Sax, supra note 195, at 15. The MSVRO does establish a standard of at least
three adverse determinations before sanction procedures are initiated in several instances.
See MSVRO Contract, supra note 144, at 21-22, 24 & supp. 3-5.
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The PRO program marks the federal government's latest incur-
sion into the health care system. PRO review groups are now mak-
ing many of the same decisions on patient admissions that the at-
tending physician made a few years ago. Furthermore, Congress
gave PROs greater power to deny payment for patient treatment
and impose sanctions on physicians and hospitals that consistently
overtreat Medicare patients. The government's role in the health
care marketplace under prospective payment and the PRO Act has
shifted from that of a partner to a controlling interest. Physician
and provider groups should continue to insist upon greater legisla-
tive or administrative confinement of the PRO's discretion wher-
ever possible215 so as to prevent the abuse of review mechanisms
and sanctions during PRO reviews.
ADDENDUM
As of April 1986, many physicians and providers have realized
that PROs are taking their Medicare peer review activities seri-
ously. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has put
pressure on individual PROs to exercise their payment denial and
sanction authority by carefully timed news releases on quality of
care issues. Stories depicting widespread physician incompetence
have appeared in local newspapers.' HCFA statistical inquiries
have also uncovered higher than projected mortality rates in cer-
tain hospitals.2 These and other stories related to the PRO pro-
gram have clearly put physicians and providers on the defensive.
In addition to addressing quality of care concerns, HCFA's peer
review offensive has directly affected physician and provider pay-
ments. As of March 24, 1986, physicians and providers can no
longer rely on a "favorable presumption" to guarantee payment in
215. See Medicare Agencies Now Judging Surgery, Rich. Times Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1984,
at 1, col. 4 ("If it turns out that [the PROs] are going to become the primary rationers of
medical care, then I think you will see a lot of concern that will become very aggres-
sive."--Statement by AMA official).
1. See, e.g., Efforts to Discipline Doctors Increasing, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 20,
1986, at A-1, col. 5; Disciplinary System Is Criticized, id., Feb. 4, 1986, at A-i, col. 3.
2. See Sharon McIlrath, HCFA Data Release Gets Mixed Reactions, Am. Med. News,
Mar. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (describing HCFA's study of nearly 11 million Medicare patient
records showing abnormal mortality and discharge rates at 2,300 U.S. hospitals and public
reaction to same); States Sent Data To Check On Hospitals, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Mar. 3, 1986, at A-1, col. 6 (discussing initial release of HCFA data to PROs prior to HCFA
decision to disseminate information generally in response to Freedom of Information Act
requests).
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situations where the provider has a small number of payment de-
nial errors.3 This rule change requires that PROs review each in-
stance of Medicare payment for noncovered services. 4 In support of
the new role, HCFA relied on a 1983 General Accounting Office
recommendation 5 and its own program experience. Accordingly,
HCFA decided that general waivers of liability were no longer
necessary.
PRO reviews of current medical practices clearly serve both
Medicare cost control and quality of care functions. However, fol-
lowing a pattern reminiscent of the PSRO program's implementa-
tion,7 the federal government has emphasized the PRO program's
quality of care role. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) now
claims, in its own unpublished report of trends in the medical pro-
fession, that "20,000 to 45,000 of the nation's 400,000 doctors are
likely candidates for some sort of [peer review] discipline." 8 These
statistics are based upon general population prevalence rates of al-
coholism, drug abuse, mental illness, criminality, and associated
problems and are not physician-specific.9 OIG's involvement in the
study is certainly more significant than the results, given OIG's
role in reviewing PRO proposed sanctions.
The first group of PRO-HCFA contracts are currently under re-
view. HCFA has sent notices to seven of the first fifteen organiza-
tions up for renewal stating that their contracts will not be re-
newed automatically.10 In anticipation of HCFA pressure during
3. See 51 Fed. Reg. 6222 (1986) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.332 -.336) (noting that
over 80i, of all providers had qualified for a favorable presumption); see also supra notes
83, 147 & 171 and accompanying text.
4. See 51 Fed. Reg. 6225, 6226 (1986) (HCFA justification).
5. See id. at 6224 (discussing GAO's view that provider participation in Medicare over
several years educates providers about covered services and that tighter limitation of liabil-
ity rules would save Medicare program funds).
6. Id.
7. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
8. See Disciplinary System Is Criticized, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 4, 1986, at 1,
col. 3.
9. Id. Although the prevalence of these problems among physicians may not differ from
the general population, the OIG's study is seriously flawed by drawing conclusions about
physicians from non-physician-specific data.
10. See 7 PROs Get Non-Renewal Notices, Am. Med. News, Apr. 4, 1986, at 1, col (noting
that the seven organizations will still have an opportunity to bid for the contracts). In its
non-renewal decisions, HCFA relied on PRO failure to meet contract objectives and, in
some cases, PRO failure to impose a sufficient number of payment denials and sanctions
against physicians and providers. Id. at 69. Some PRO officials accused HCFA of. showing
little flexibility in interpreting contract goals and overemphasizing numbers of payment de-
nials and sanctions. Id. at 69-70.
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contract renewals, PROs around the country have initiated disci-
plinary proceedings against over 950 physicians and 180 hospi-
tals.11 Although GIG has sanctioned only one physician as of
March 1986,12 PROs are apparently recommending additional
sanction cases to OIG for review as the PRO-HCFA contract re-
newal deadlines draw nearer. The procedures followed in these
PRO sanction reviews have raised significant due process ques-
tions, highlighting the problems inherent in unbridled PRO discre-
tion.13 Based on the author's personal observation, judicial chal-
lenges to PRO sanction procedures cannot be far off.
11. See Efforts To Discipline Doctors Increasing, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 20,
1986, at A-1, col. 5. In spite of the increased sanction activity, an OIG report found "serious
deficiencies" in PRO reviews of Medicare cases dating from October, 1983 (over nine
months before the first PRO-HCFA contracts began) to May, 1985 (the first full month
after final sanction rules were released). The OIG report found that 74 out of 4,724 cases
flagged by PROs as suspicious discharges were "so outrageous" that they would justify HHS
disciplinary action. However, PROs referred none of the 74 cases to OIG for action. The
Inspector General questioned the lack of followup and stated that the PROs "should ask the
physician why he discharged this person, and question the decision. If they're not satisfied
with the answer, or if they see that it's part of a pattern of activity knock that sucker out of
the program right off the bat." Medicare: Controls Assailed, Richmond Times-Dispatch,
Jan. 27, 1986, at A-1, col. 2.
12. See Physicians Fin. News, Mar. 30, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (reporting that OIG had nine
other cases awaiting sanction approval). Interestingly enough, during its 10 year history, the
PSRO program produced 70 sanctions against physicians and hospitals. See Efforts To Dis-
cipline Doctors Increasing, Richmond Tiems-Dispatch, Jan. 20, 1986, at A-i, col. 5.
13. The author currently has a case pending before OIG for review. The Medical Society
of Virginia Review Organization (MSVRO) gave the physician little opportunity to respond
to MSVRO allegations of gross and flagrant conduct. The MSVRO Quality Assurance Com-
mittee held one meeting on the case, at which it cross-examined the physician without al-
lowing participation by counsel, even in an advisory role. The MSVRO then produced a
"record" of the meeting containing excerpts, taken out of context, from the taped discus-
sion. Counsel was pot allowed to review or respond to this record until after the MSVRO
Board of Directors ratified its committee's sanction recommendation and sent the record to
OIG. The MSVRO then refused to release the committee meeting tape until after the physi-
cian's 30-day period for sending any rebuttal to OIG had expired.
Although OIG has a statutory duty to review the merits of the sanction recommendation
and the procedures followed, the Inspector General's statements about PRO sanction inac-
tivity raise questions about OIG impartiality in reviewing such cases. See supra addedum
note 11. The result could be that the merits of sanctioning the physician for his treatment of
one Medicare patient and the questionable procedures followed in reaching this result will
remain unexamined prior to OIG action (or inaction) within the 120-day sanction review
period.
